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Abstract
Whether good macroeconomic policy facilitates aid effectiveness in generating growth is a
highly debated topic. In this paper we investigate if economic reform has a favorable effect
on the aid-growth relation—specifically, if reform enhances the effect of aid on growth. In
doing so, we also construct a new policy index and examine the robustness of the Burnside
and Dollar (2000) ‘policy view’. The results indicate that although our new policy index and
reform are both growth enhancing, they do not increase aid-effectiveness and aid seem to
play no positive role in the picture.
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1. Introduction  
The effectiveness of multilateral foreign aid in promoting growth has been a highly 
debated issue. The debate started following a recent paper by Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
where the authors claim that aid helps growth only in a good macroeconomic policy 
environment. This particular ‘policy view’ has also had a tremendous impact on donor 
policies (Easterly, 2003)—given limited resources and the implication that aid be directed 
to countries with good policies, many developing poor countries with questionable policy 
record would be especially be at risk of losing foreign assistance. A large number of 
empirical papers followed to re-examine the robustness of this particular policy view, as 
well as to assess the aid-growth relationship in this light (for example, Alvi et al, 
forthcoming; Collier and Dehn, 2001; Collier and Dollar, 2002; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; 
Easterly et al, 2004, Dalgaard et al, 2004; Clemens et al; 2004; Rajan et al 2005 and 
Rodrik 2005, to name a few). Most of the empirical papers find that the policy view is not 
robust to the sample used (Easterly et al, 2004, Dalgaard et al, 2004) or the empirical 
specifications (Alvi et al, forthcoming).    
In this paper we attempt to check the robustness of the policy view in a more 
direct way. In order to improve the policy environment, the IMF imposes structural 
reforms on aid receiving countries. We plan to investigate whether such reforms 
themselves are growth enhancing and, more importantly, whether reforms increase aid 
effectiveness in a typical developing country. While policy itself is a complex outcome of 
several economic factors, reform is a relatively more straightforward measure. It is 
noteworthy that donors have no direct control over the macroeconomic environment of a 
country but they do have direct control over the ‘reform’ agenda. To our knowledge there 
has not been any rigorous study in the literature that directly tests the impact of reform on 
aid effectiveness. In this paper we intend to fill this gap. We estimate a typical aid-growth 
regression that includes a reform dummy as one of the explanatory variables. We also 
construct a new policy measure by broadening the Burnside and Dollar policy index to 
incorporate more variables. This enables us to investigate the traditional aid-policy-
growth nexus in the presence of the reform dummy, while using a more comprehensive   2
policy index.
1 We also directly test the aid-reform-growth relation via the effect of the 
aid-reform interaction term. 
Section two describes the construction of a new policy index that we use in this 
paper. Section three discusses data and empirical estimation; section 4 presents the results 
and concludes with a discussion. 
2. Construction of New Policy Index 
The Burnside and Dollar (2000) policy index has been used in most of the 
empirical studies in recent years. This index is defined as a weighted sum of budget 
deficit/surplus, inflation rate and the Sachs-Warner openness index where each 
component is weighted by its coefficient in the growth regression. Although this index 
provides a good idea of a country’s policy stance, we believe that it is not broad enough 
for a typical developing economy. We construct a more comprehensive policy index by 
incorporating two additional variables—credit to the private sector as a percentage of 
GDP (referred to as “private”), and telephone main lines per 1000 people (telephone)—
into the existing index. While credit to the private sector captures the financial depth or 
degree of financial liberalization, telephone main line is used as an indicator of 
infrastructure policy. The new index that we consider is given below.
2     
Policynew = f(Budget, Inflation, SACW, Private Credit, Telephone) 
 
In all cases, as in Burnside and Dollar (2000), weights are assigned based on the 
coefficients of the variables in a growth regression that does not include aid. Although 
the new index is not exhaustive, it includes a key financial variable and a commonly used 
basic access variable that represents infrastructure. It is widely believed that credit 
availability and better communications are prerequisites to creating a favorable growth 
scenario. Also, in most developing countries, the depth of the credit market and telephone 
main lines are very much within the control of domestic policy, making their inclusion in 
a policy index quite desirable. Improvements in these aspects would generally indicate 
transition to better policy.  
                                                 
1 In fact, one could argue that the exclusion of the reform dummy may leave substantial omitted variable 
bias in the regression.  
2 The Burnside-Dollar policy index is given by f (Budget, Inflation, SACW)   3
3. Empirical Estimation and Data 
The original Burnside-Dollar (henceforth BD)
 type empirical model used to test 
the impact of reform on the relationship between aid and growth can be specified as 
follows.
3 
GDPGit= a0 + a1LGDP0it + a2 ETHNICit + a3ASSASINit+a4(ETHNIC * ASSASIN)it  
+ a5  (INSTITUTION)it+a6SSAi+a7EASIAi+a8M2+a9AIDit  + a10  (AID*Policyit) + a12  
POLICYit + Uit          
 
We augment this with a reform variable and use the following alternative specifications:  
 
GDPGit= a0 + a1LGDP0it + a2 ETHNICit + a3ASSASINit+a4(ETHNIC * ASSASIN)it  
+ a5 (INSTITUTION)it+a6SSAi+a7EASIAi+a8M2 +a9AIDit + a10  Reform + a11  POLICYit 




GDPGit= a0 + a1LGDP0it + a2 ETHNICit + a3ASSASINit+a4(ETHNIC * ASSASIN)it  
+ a5 (INSTITUTION)it+a6SSAi+a7EASIAi+a8M2 +a9AIDit + a10  Reform + a11  POLICYit 
+ a12Aid*Policy + Uit  
 
This is similar to the specification used by Burnside and Dollar (2000) except that now 
reform is included as one of the regressors.  
We employ the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator of Arellano 
and Bond (1991) in our growth regressions. This estimator removes country specific 
effects by taking first differences and makes use of lagged values of the dependent 
                                                 
3 GDPGit is the growth of Real GDP per capita, LGDP0it is the real GDP per capita at the beginning of each 
period, ETHNIC stands for ethnic fractionalization; ASSASIN represents assassinations; (ETHNIC * 
ASSAS) it is the interaction term between ETHNIC and ASSASIN; INSTITUTION presents institutional 
quality; SSA and EASIA are dummy variables for Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia respectively; 
REFORM is a dummy variable that takes 1 in the post reform period and 0 otherwise, POLICY is an index 
constructed as described in the previous section; AID is Official Development Assistance (ODA), AID* 
REFORM is an interaction term between aid and REFORM. In all the above i indexes country and t 
indexes time. 
   4
variable and the predetermined variables as instruments. Here Aid, Policy, and Reform 
are considered as endogenous and their respective lagged values are used as instruments. 
Note that the SSA, EASIA and ETHNIC*ASSASIN dummies are dropped in the GMM 
regression.   
We use aggregate aid data from 31 developing countries with reform dates for the 
period 1974-2001. This gives us 7 time periods, since we consider 4-year averages. 
However, in our GMM regression we lose 2 time periods due to the use of lagged values 
and thus end up with 155 observations. Information on reform date is obtained from the 
IMF.
4 Of the reforming countries in our sample, we include only those that initiated 
reform no later than 1992. This would allow enough time to assess the effects of reform 
on subsequent growth. Data on all other variables including credit to the private sector as 
percent of GDP, and trade as a percent of GDP are obtained from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (2004). The following countries are included in our 
sample. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cameroon, Colombia, Cost Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, India, 
Jamaica, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Sri 
Lanka, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Zambia. This country list is smaller than 
Roodman’s because not all countries had reform information within the period under 
consideration.   
4. Results and Discussion:  
The GMM results presented in Table 1 show that reform has a direct positive 
effect on growth. This is true for all cases that we consider. The new policy index is also 
positive and significant in all cases. But the BD policy appears to lose significance once 
we bring the reform dummy into the picture. This could be due to the fact that the new 
policy measure is more comprehensive than the BD policy index. The institution variable 
looses its significance also once we introduce the reform dummy. Interestingly, neither 
the aid-policy interaction term, nor the aid-reform interaction term is significant in our 
GMM regressions. Since our sample is smaller than the original BD sample (due to the 
                                                 
4 The reform date is the year in which the IMF had the first standby arrangement (SBA) with the country in 
question where the IMF would lend conditional on implementation of the reform programs. See IMF: 
Terms of IMF Financial Assistance 2007.     5
inclusion of the reform variable), we try BD type specification (i.e., regression without 
the reform variable) for this new sample. The result is presented in Table 2. Surprisingly, 
for this sample BD policy still remains insignificant, though our new policy index 
remains positive and highly significant. Thus we provide two new robustness checks on 
the BD conclusion—(a) using reform, we do not find evidence that ‘aid is effective only 
in a good policy environment’, and (b) without reform, we do not find evidence that ‘aid 
is effective only in a good policy environment’ in our new sample. The latter result is in 
conformity with Easterly et al (2004), which shows that BD results are highly sensitive to 
the sample used. Furthermore, we do not find evidence to support the claim that aid is 
more effective after reform (note that aid*reform is not positive and significant either). 
Although reform itself always turns out to be highly positive and significant, we find that 
aid hardly has any impact on growth. For robustness check, we also run the regression 
without policy index, but with its individual components appearing separately in the 
regression. This changes our model specification and we still find a similar conclusion—
that reform is highly positive and significant, but aid and aid*reform are both 
insignificant.
5 
Our findings offer a new perspective on the aid effectiveness debate: whether aid is 
productive only in a good policy scenario can also be assessed in terms of aid effectiveness in a 
reforming country scenario. Whereas policy as measured in BD is the result of various 
macroeconomic outcomes, the reform mandate is more salient and less dependent on macro 
performance. Our conclusion that reform itself is highly significant in fostering growth, though 
aid is not - despite good policy or reform, offers an interesting perspective. Perhaps policymakers 
and donors ought to concentrate on reform and its long-term effects while aid should be used as 
incentive to achieve that end.  
                                                 
5 Note that when we do not include policy index in our regression, we need to include budget, inflation and 
openness (i.e. the three main components of policy index) separately in the regression because these three 
variables are standard covariates in a typical growth regression. Reform alone can not capture their effects 
because desired levels of these variables can possibly be achieved without reform and also reform does not 
guarantee a desired state of these variables.    6








Note: Dependent variable is GDP. *, **and *** indicate10%, 5% and 1% significant levels 
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. The Sargan of Over-identifying Restrictions shows the 
validity of the instruments used and there is also no second order serial correlation in the differenced error 












LGDP  0.06 
(0.08)    
0.02 
(0.08)    
-0.02 
 (0.09)    
-0.01 
 (0.08)     
ASSASIN  0.11  
(0 .19)    
0.13  
(0 .18)    
0.02  
(0 .20)    
-0.01 
(0 .20)     








INSTITUTION  0.38 
(0.29)    
0.45* 
(0.27)    
0.23 
 (0.29)    
0.32 
 (0.28)     
REFORM  2.15**  
(0 .93)    
2.34*  
(0 .85)    
3.27**  
(1 .04)    
3.14***  
(0 .91)     
AID   -0.004 
(0.32)    
-0.02 
(0.20)    
-0.26 
 (0.30)    
-0.08 
 (0.22)     
POLICY  0.002  
(0 .32)    
0.18  
(0 .31)    
1.57***  
(0 .43)    
1.32**  
(0 .45)     
AID*REFORM  -0.03 
(0.30)    
   0.08 
 (0.27)    
  
AID*POLICY        -0.01 
(0.06)    
  -0.01 
 (0.22)     
No. Of 
Observations 
155 155  155  155 
Sargan Test  
(P-Value)  






0.76 0.58  0.69  0.67   7





















Note: *, **and *** indicate10%, 5% and 1% significant levels respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The Sargan test of Over-identifying Restrictions shows the validity of the instruments used and there is also 
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0.4716 0.3573   8
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